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Abstract.
The aim of this work is to analyze income mobility and inequality during different economic
shocks in Argentina in the 1990’s, using five one-year panels: 1991/1992, 1993/1994,
1994/1995, 1998/1999, and 1999/2000. In particular, we address two questions. First, what
can we say about the relationship between income mobility and the inequality cross-sectional
analysis? Second, who got ahead, who fell behind and who kept up economic position during
the different economic cycle facts that occurred in the 1990 decade? In other words, were the
‘upwardly mobile’, ‘immobile’ and ‘downwardly mobile’ always the same kind of
individuals, or can we establish different group characteristics depending on the type of
economic shock?
1. Introduction.
Although there is a vast amount of literature dealing with income distribution analysis from a cross-
sectional perspective, studies about the dynamics of inequality - or more generally, about changes in
economic well-being and the factors associated with it – have only recently been elaborated in
developing countries (see for instance, Grootaert et al., 1997; Glewwe and Hall, 1998; Baulch and
Hoddinot, 2000; Fields et al., 2001). This delay was basically due to the lack of the required panel data
surveys until recent years in many developing countries. To our knowledge, not many detailed studies
on income mobility clarifying its link with inequality and identifying the characteristics of economic
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in different periods of the economic cycle have been yet done. For sure, the case
of Argentina has not yet been analyzed even though the unstable macroeconomic environment in the
past decade makes this question about income mobility, in a context of increasing inequality,
particularly interesting.
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Even if the existence of a link between income mobility and inequality is evident, it is less clear the
way in which the relationship works. The study of this particular relationship, that indeed is country-
specific, lacks from most previous works on the dynamics of income distribution. Research on income
mobility offers a dynamic dimension to the understanding of income distribution, which is missing in
the cross sectional approach. Nonetheless these studies depend on the availability of panel data. The
problem with panel data is that only very few allow for the analysis of mobility over the life cycle, and
these usually present problems due to attrition bias (see, inter alia, Fitzgerald et al. 1998 ; Lillard et al.,
1998). Panel data that allow for the analysis of short-term mobility are more common, but do not give
a very informative and conclusive picture of the real dynamics of income distribution. For instance,
the possibility that a progressively mobile society in the short-run, may come together with increasing
inequality in the medium-run, cannot be excluded. In this paper we show how the Argentinean
experience during the nineties provides a good example of such possibility in which apparently
progressive income mobility coincided with increasingly regressive income distribution. Thus, we
consider that the study of both dimensions of the income distribution is relevant since each one gives a
different snapshot of income distribution.
The first part of the paper looks at the evolution of income inequality and mobility over time, for the
total population in our samples. Usual inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient, percentages
and ratios of income owned by each income decile are provided for the macro cross-sectional picture.
The income mobility measure used in this descriptive overlook at the 1990 decade is the directional
income movement measure “changes in log family income”, following Fields et al. (2001).1 By putting
inequality and income mobility trends into the same track we observe that a one-year “pro-poor”
mobility has not assured a more equal income distribution. We have also shed light on the relationship
between mobility and the trends in cross-sectional inequality using Galton’s (1889) statistical model
relating final year income to base year income. By so doing we observe that in some periods it is
possible to find a significant regression to the mean (indicating a progressive income mobility) and an
increasing income variance (indicating a regressing income distribution). Special attention has been
paid to our empirical work to avoid the possibility of measurement error driving our results, by not
only using reported base year income in the analysis, but also predicted base year income, in an effort
to estimate a ‘permanent’ household income level. In order to advance a possible explanation on this
counterintuitive finding we look at the mean mobility by income quintiles distinguishing between the
quintile immobile individuals, the new comers and those that departed. This additional statistical
analysis shows that, in spite of the fact that most of the upwardly mobile individuals belong to the
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lowest quintiles (at a decreasing rate over time), the new lowest quintile comers (people leapfrogged
by the first quintile upwardly mobile) suffered negative mobility throughout the whole period. And the
immobile individuals of the lowest quintile have not only suffered negative income mobility but also
at an increasing rate during the whole nineties’ decade. So the lowest quintile is becoming poorer over
time. The inverse is observed for the richest quintile: its ‘immobile’ individuals have benefited from
positive income mobility during the economic booms and most of the recession years, while its
‘downwardly mobile’ have been replaced by new entrants that experience increasingly positive
income mobility over time. Therefore our candidate explanation is linked to the impoverishment of the
immobile poor, and the new poor, and with the enrichment of the very rich and the new entrants in this
category, at higher rates during the decade.
The second question discussed in this paper has to do with the identification of the characteristics that
determine income changes as well as the analysis and portrait of different subgroups of population
according to their mobility performance. Probably the most intuitive way of thinking about mobility is
through the traditional concept of transition matrices. For this reason, we have divided the sample
population into three groups: the ‘upwardly mobile’, the ‘immobile’ and the ‘downwardly mobile’
individuals, according to the movements observed between initial income levels to final income levels.
We have adopted three possible definitions for these population groups, based on different weights
given to relative versus absolute mobility, in an effort to do a robustness test on the group definitions,
as well as to satisfy different views of how mobility is to be measured.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used as well as some important
variable definitions and concepts. Section 3 deals with our first question about the evolution of income
inequality (subsection 3.1) and income mobility (subsection 3.2) over time, and the possible
relationship between both concepts (subsection 3.3). Section 4 spots the characteristics that determine
income changes in a univariate and regression framework (subsections 4.1 and 4.2), and identifies the
different group characteristics of income ‘upwardly mobile’, ‘immobile’ and ‘downwardly mobile’
individuals over time, depending on the type of economic shock (subsection 4.3). Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology and description of the data.
The study of income mobility requires the use of longitudinal data. The data used for
Argentina come from EPH (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares) the Argentinean Household
Rotating Panel Survey elaborated by INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos).  It
is a national semestral-rotating panel, where households are followed during a maximum of
one year and a half. Five year panels for Gran Buenos Aires (for the years 1991/1992,
1993/1994, 1994/1995, 1998/1999 and 1999/2000) have been constructed to study the
dynamics of income movements during very different economic pictures: two panels of
economic boom years (the first one capturing a hyperinflationary episode in the Argentinean
economy), a year-panel during an transitory recession (due to the so-called Tequila crisis),
and the two last panels that coincide with the starting years of a deep recession from which
Argentina is still suffering. Changes in the coding of the questionnaires (in particular,
methodological changes in the household identifying variable) make matching impossible for
the rest of years that would be needed to get a complete one-year panel series for the 1990’s,
as it was initially contemplated.
The initial sample surveys have around 6000 individuals (the 1991 sample is significantly
smaller though, having only around 4500 observations). Due to the rotating nature of the EPH
survey (25% of the sample is renewed in each wave), around 50% of the original sample is
dropped the second year. Indeed, this proportion is usually slightly higher, since households
that move and are not found at the moment of the re-interview are not traced but replaced. We
excluded those individuals misreporting birth date or sex in one of the two years of the panel,
since these were the variables used to match individuals within households. We additionally
dropped those individuals who had missing information about basic household characteristics
used in the regression framework2. The final panel samples represent around 30-35% of the
initial surveys. The question now is by how much the observed attrition biases the
representativeness of our panels. Table 1 presents a set of basic descriptive statistics, both for
the panels and initial sample surveys. In general, and since the time span is only one year, the
panel data present small non-systematic differences with the initial surveys, suggesting that
attrition bias is not such that invalidates the analysis of the panel data. Furthermore, we have
estimated our results correcting for attrition, where the longitudinal weights have been
calculated from a probit model estimating the probability of staying in the panels 3. These
results, where attrition has been taken into account, do not differ in any significant manner
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from the also estimated, though not shown, unweighted results (available from the authors
upon request).
<Table 1 around here>
The income variable used is adult-equivalent family income measured in logarithms, using the
INDEC adult equivalence scale, raised to the power of 0.8, a theta parameter corresponding to
low levels of economies of scale. The unit of analysis is the adult individual aged from 18 up
to 70 years old with non-negative family income in both years of the panel. Consumption is
considered a better measure of economic well-being than income (see Deaton, 1997).
However, and for availability reasons, this paper analyses inequality and mobility using
income and not consumption (consumption is not present in the Argentinean EPH).
To analyze inequality we use common inequality measures (Gini coefficient, decile shares of
income, …). On the other hand, though many economists are attracted by the problem of
measuring income mobility, there is not a unified and widely accepted method of measuring
it. In this paper we use a directional income-movement measure: change in log adult-
equivalent family income, as the variable to be explained in the univariate and regression
framework4. However, and as already exposed, in defining our different population groups
according to their mobility performance, into ‘upwardly mobile’, ‘immobile’ and
‘downwardly mobile’, we have considered three different intuitive definitions that intend to
be a hybrid of absolute and relative mobility conceptions. The idea is to go from a relative
mobility definition based on decile movements, to a progressive reduction of the relative
mobility element within the definition. The underlying rationale of this decision is to do a
robustness test on the group definitions, as well as to satisfy different views of how mobility
is to be measured.
Formally, let Yit+1 = Yit + ∆Yi, where Y represents reported adult-equivalent family income
measured in logarithms. Let also Dit represent the income decile of individual i at time t,
calculated over Y, and mean(∆Y) represent the overall population mean change in log-family
income. Then:
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- Definition 1: “Most Relative” income mobility group definition.
• An individual i will be considered an ‘Upwardly Mobile’ (UM) if ∆Yi>0, ∆Yi>mean(∆Y)
and Dit+1>Dit.
• An individual i will be considered a ‘Downwardly Mobile’ (DM) if ∆Yi<0,
∆Yi<mean(∆Y) and Dit+1<Dit.
• An individual i will be considered an ‘Immobile’ (IM), otherwise.
- Definition 2: “Intermediate” income mobility group definition.
• An individual i will be considered an UM if ∆Yi>0, ∆Yi>mean(∆Y) and rankit+1>rankit.
• An individual i will be considered a DM if ∆Yi<0, ∆Yi<mean(∆Y) and rankit+1<rankit.
• An individual i will be considered an IM, otherwise.
- Definition 3: “Least Relative” income mobility group definition.
• An individual i will be considered a UM if ∆Yi>0 and  ∆Yi>mean(∆Y).
• An individual i will be considered a DM if ∆Yi<0 and ∆Yi<mean(∆Y).
• An individual i will be considered an IM, otherwise.
According to the ‘Most Relative’ income mobility group definition, an ‘upwardly mobile’
would be an individual experiencing not only a positive income shock, moving upwards more
than the mean population income movement, but also jumping to a higher income decile. This
is the strictest definition of the ‘upwardly mobile’ group, since we force the individual to
jump up the decile ladder to belong to this population group. Individuals from the highest
decile that stay in the same decile in the next period will be considered as belonging to an
immobile population. A ‘downwardly mobile’ would then be an individual experiencing
negative income shocks, worse than the mean population shocks, moving downwards in the
decile transition matrix. Therefore, nobody belonging to the first decile that stays in the first
decile will be considered a downwardly mobile, but an immobile. The idea is that if you are
already at the bottom of the distribution you cannot ‘become’ a downwardly mobile, you are
already in the most vulnerable position of the distribution. The immobile individuals will be
those not included in the previous two categories.
The ‘Intermediate’ income mobility group definition relaxes the previous definition, requiring
only a change in the rank of the individual in the income distribution instead of a decile
change, either upwards or downwards, to become an upwardly mobile or a downwardly
mobile.
The ‘Least Relative’ income mobility group definition only requires a positive income
mobility shock, better than the mean population mobility shock, to be considered an upwardly
mobile individual, and a negative income mobility shock, worse than the mean population
mobility shock, to be considered a downwardly mobile individual. The immobile group
category is here practically insignificant.
This is how income inequality and mobility will be measured. The rest of the variables that
will be used in our analysis to try and characterize the dynamics of inequality are gender, age
and education of the highest earner, number of children under 14 years old in the household,
number of elderly (over 60) in the household, number of income earners in the household, and
occupational status for the highest earner. As occupational status, we have constructed a
seven-category variable: employer, “satisfied” self-employed, “unsatisfied” self-employed,
“satisfied” employee, “unsatisfied” employee, unemployed and discouraged/inactive.5 We
focus on the highest earner instead of the head of household since, for a non-negligible
number of households, the head was not interviewed.
Concerned about measurement error as we are, we will check our results, considering in our
econometric sections, not only reported income levels but also predicted income levels. In
particular, individual’s base year family income level will be predicted using a set of
household characteristics and a series of variables indicating the household’s level of comfort
(in particular, if it has current water, electricity and stone walls, if it is owned or rented, if
there is domestic service or not).
3. Income Inequality and Mobility in Argentina during the nineties: description and
relationship.
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3.1. Description of general inequality trends.
The most recent and comprehensive survey about income distributional analysis in Argentina
is due to Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2002). Using various usual measures of
income distribution they supply a clear picture about the evolution of income distribution in
Argentina: inequality has been monotonically increasing in Argentina during the 1990’s, a
period of high macroeconomic instability. In particular, and according to their calculations,
Gini and Theil indicators rose by around 13%, Atkinson measures by around 25 % and the
difference between the top and bottom decile has also notoriously increased. These results are
corroborated by other research work (see inter alia, Altimir and Beccaria, 2000; 2001) as well
as official sources (Informe Economico, MECON).
There are, however, well-known problems associated with the use of household sample
surveys (see inter alia, Deaton 1997, Ravallion, 2001). Among others, underestimation seems
to be the highest disadvantage. Concerned by this point Székely and Hilgert (1999) have
concluded that, “as in the rest of Latin-American countries, Argentinean data are informative
about a certain spectrum of society that excludes the richest households”6. Such an
underestimation at the top of the distribution logically implies that inequality is also
underestimated.
Having mentioned the underestimation problem in the Argentinean household surveys, we
now analyze the general trend of income distribution in Argentina during the nineties using
the cross-sectional EPH surveys. Using customary measures of inequality we find similar
results to the studies mentioned in the income distribution literature review for Argentina.
Tables 2a and 2b present our calculations using the original surveys and the year-panels,
respectively.
In table 2a we use the cross-sectional surveys to see that inequality has increased during the
nineties. In particular, the Gini coefficient over the adult-equivalent family income has
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increased from 0.45 in 1991 to 0.49 in 2000 (using per capita family income the Gini goes
from 0.48 in 1991 to 0.51 in 2000). Such inequality growth has not followed a linear trend.
From 1991 to 1993, inequality decreased and then grew more or less sustainable. Looking at
the evolution of the income shares by initial quintile it is clear that the benefited quintiles of
the period are the two highest ones which have increased their income shares between 1991
and 2000 by around 3-4% (in particular, if we look at the shares by income decile, the 8th and
9th decile are the ones that have a better performance, while the 1st decile is the one that loses
more during this period). In table 2.b. similar statistics are presented for the year-panel
subsamples. Results obtained are similar: the Gini coefficient over the adult-equivalent family
income went from 0.42 in 1991 to 0.47 in 2000 (and from 0.45 to 0.49 using per capita family
income). And again, the highest quintiles are the ones that accumulate more income share,
while the lowest quintile has the largest decrease.
<Tables 2a and 2b around here>
3.2. Description of general mobility trends.
Turning to income mobility, table 3 gives the mean change in log family income by initial
income quintile and decile, for all year-panels. It appears as a structural fact that those
belonging to the first quintile are the more positively mobile, and those belonging to the
highest quintile are the less mobile (they suffer negative changes on average). Nevertheless
when looking at the mean change in log family income by initial income decile, we observe
that the relationship between income change and base year income is non-monotonous,
suggesting that the relation between these two variables is slightly more complex than simply
saying there is regression towards the mean. A multivariate analysis is needed to better clarify
this question.
< Table 3 around here>
To give a better picture of mobility patterns, quintile transition matrices have been computed
and are shown in Tables 4a-4e. In general, comparing the first (1991/1992) and last
(1999/2000) panel, we observe that the proportion of individuals in the diagonal, i.e.,
individuals that stay in the same income quintile, has increased during the nineties. In
particular the percentage of individuals in the [1,1] cell goes from 49 to 57% while in the [5,5]
cell the percentage goes from 67 to 79%. From the diagonal elements, only the percentage of
individuals in the [2,2] cell has diminished during the nineties. In general, the proportion of
individuals from this cell that jump to the first quintile has increased, and that jump up to the
fourth has decreased (other movements remaining more or less stable over time). There are
also interesting changes over time in the quintile transitions of those starting in the fourth
quintile. The proportion of these people that jumped to the fifth quintile decreased from 21-
23% in out first panels to 15% in the last panel. There is evidence of an enlargement of the
gap, in terms of relative mobility performance, between those initially in the fourth and fifth
quintile, which links to the increasing detachment of the richest, in line with the evidence
provided in the inequality trends.
<Tables 4a-4e around here>
We now turn to the analysis of mobility by population groups, using the definitions stated
above. Table 5.a provides the percentage of individuals in each mobility category for all years
and all three definitions. We observe that the percentage of the ‘upwardly mobile’ (UM)
diminishes when comparing the first and last panels, no matter which definition of population
groups is used. Results concerning monotonicity and the size of the drop are, though,
definition-dependent. The drop is continuous until 1994/95 with all definitions, and it
increases for the last two panels, though not attaining 1991/92 levels, with the last two
definitions (‘Intermediate’ and ‘Least Relative’). On the other side, the proportion of
‘downwardly mobile’ (DM) in the population has increased dramatically (even close to
doubled with the last two definitions). Note that, by definition, the ‘Most Relative’
formulation of population groups is the most static one over time, since it is the strictest
definition of a mobility status (either upwards or downwards). For this reason, the proportion
of Immobile individuals (IM) is always significantly larger than with the other two
definitions.
Table 5.b now gives the percentages of UM, DM and IM for all panels, by initial income
quintile. We observe that the lower the quintile, the higher is the proportion of UM, no matter
which definition used. Concerning the evolution over time, results are again, definition-
dependent. Looking at the ‘Most Relative’ definition --that is, the definition that adds a decile
movement condition—we see that the proportion of UM belonging to the first quintile
experiences a large drop (from 62% to 55%), while with the other two definitions, the drop is
practically insignificant (from 71% to around 69%). In other words, it becomes harder over
time to jump high enough so as to change decile, for the poorest individuals. Equivalently, it
becomes slightly easier to jump to lower deciles, since the proportion of DM slightly
increases or stays more or less constant over time for all quintiles with the ‘Most Relative’
definition, while increases (nearly doubles) with the other two definitions, again for all
quintiles. The distribution of IM is more or less stable across quintiles for all years with each
definition. However, as already shown in table 5.a, this category practically disappears as
population group with the ‘Intermediate’ and ‘Least Relative’ definitions. These last two
definitions are, as a matter of fact, much more volatile, or in other words, more dependent on
the economic cycle.
<Tables 5a and 5b around here>
Up to here we have provided simple descriptive statistics concerning inequality and mobility
trends in Argentina during the nineties. From these results we observe that, while inequality
has been increasing, the most ‘upwardly mobile’ individuals seem to have been those
belonging to low-income deciles. These indicators manifest an apparent puzzle: the ‘upwardly
mobile’ during the nineties have been the poor, but it is the poor who have lost the most in
terms of income share. How can we link these two apparently contradictory results? In order
to enlighten this question, we now turn to the analysis of the links between inequality and
mobility trends.
3.3. The relationship between micro convergence analysis and the cross-sectional
inequality analysis.
To tackle our first question about the relationship between mobility and cross-sectional
inequality, we depart from the simple Galton (1889) model of regression towards the mean:
ititit uyy ++=+ )log()log( 1 βα (1)
where the stochastic term uit is assumed to be independent of yit and be i.i.d. across
individuals and periods. Taking the variance of logarithm (V) as inequality measure, one then
gets:
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where the last term is the variance of the residual. In this model, if β∈ (0,1), equation (1) says
that final income is positively correlated with initial income but, on average, it moves closer
to the population mean. In other words, we would have regression towards the mean, or micro
convergence: individuals with incomes above the mean can expect to keep their advantage,
though to a reduced extent, while those with low incomes can expect to jump closer to the
mean. Two other possibilities can arise: if β  is equal to one, we would have immobility, and if
it is greater than one, we would have micro divergence.
Can we have micro convergence, or equivalently, pro-poor income mobility, in a context of
increasing macro inequality? We can see, from equation (2), that this is possible, if the
variance of the residual is large enough, or equivalently if the variance of initial income (Vt)
is initially low. To see what has happened in Argentina we have estimated this model for the
five one-year panels, for the total sample population, as well as by age groups and by income
quintiles. We have done it, both using reported income and predicted income as independent
variable. Results are shown in tables 6.a and 6.b.
<Tables 6.a and 6.b around here>
When looking at the Galton’s regression model over total population, both using reported and
predicted income, we observe three structural facts about the beta coefficients. First the beta
coefficients are always less than unity, implying regression towards the mean. Second, they
are always slightly higher when using predicted income instead of reported income as a
measure of initial economic position, suggesting that mobility (and therefore, in this case,
regression to the mean) is overestimated when using reported income instead of predicted
income, which is a better measure of long-term economic position. Third, excluding the less
reliable 1991/92 panel (see footnote 2), the betas are higher at the end of the nineties than at
the beginning. This implies that there is regression to the mean, but the “progressive” mobility
is decreasing with time: initial income is more important in determining final income at the
end of the nineties than at the beginning, implying that society is becoming less mobile. On
the other hand, inequality, as measured by the variance of log income, is always increasing
within panels except for 1999/2000, where we observe a slight decrease (from 2,13 to 2,08).
This is in general consistent with other inequality measures previously discussed. Sigma-
squared seems to be therefore high enough so as to combine the increasing inequality with
betas less than unity.
If we repeat the estimation by age groups, results are quite similar (see table 6.b). There is
regression to the mean for all age groups, except in two cases when we are considering
predicted income as the measure for initial economic position: those households with a
highest earner between 30 and 40 years old in year 1991/92 and those with a highest earner of
less than 30 years old in year 1993/94. In these two cases we observe positive correlation
between initial and final income, regression to the mean when using reported income but
micro divergence when using predicted income.  We also observe that the age group
experiencing larger mobility is not always the same, suggesting that age does not play a
structural role for mobility patterns. Finally, when we run the same Galton model across
initial economic position quintiles results are quite heterogeneous. The first quintile has the
lowest betas for all the panels. In addition, we observe that the fifth quintile’s beta coefficient
increases from 0,75 in 1991/92 to 0,90 in 1999/2000. For the episodic-crisis (1994/95 panel),
we see that the richest quintile was almost immobile (beta reaches 0,99). This result may
suggest that richer deciles are better protected against economic crises.
We have seen from the analysis of simple inequality and mobility trends that a more unequal
income distribution occurs simultaneously with pro-poor (lowest deciles) income mobility.
Galton’s statistical model shows that this is generally true (excluding the two particular age
ranges in two of the panels that have already been pointed out), and the observed pro-poor
mobility is decreasing since 1993/94. The model shows that the combination of these two
effects is possible, from the moment that the variance of the residual is large enough or the
variance of initial income is low enough. Beyond the normative analysis we can derive from
this situation, it is important to clarify how both observed trends might be put onto the same
track. That is, once we know that the co-existence of both trends is possible, and that there are
different possible explanations to the facts, we want to know, in the case of Argentina, what is
driving the facts.
First of all, one of our measures of inequality consisted in the income share appropriated by
each income decile or quintile. The evolution of the shares, as exposed, has benefited the
richest. Income mobility informs us about how the composition of these deciles or quintiles is
changing. For instance, if we take the 1st quintile we can observe that some individuals have
left this quintile after enjoying positive income mobility from a year to another. Obviously,
other individuals coming from higher quintiles have replaced them, after suffering negative
income mobility. So what determines the final share of this quintile, and thus, to some extent,
the final income distribution observed, is given by the income mobility of the immobile
individuals and the new comers.
In order to understand the two apparently contradictory observed trends we look now at the
relative income mobility as the transition matrix reflects it. This gives us an idea of the
probabilities of being upwardly or downwardly mobile in the income ladder. Given the fact
that we are constrained to observe only panels of one-year time span, we also consider the n
power of these matrixes. The idea is that if the transition matrices reflect the observed relative
movements from one year to the next, the n power transition matrix gives us an idea of the
conditional movements after n years, assuming that the initial matrix applies for all
subsequent years. Therefore, under this hypothesis, we can ask for the probabilities of relative
mobility in n years conditional on the starting decile or quintile of the individual. Calculating
the n power transition matrix for n=2 and n=5 for all panels we dispose, we intend to supply
an estimate of the evolution of short and medium-run income mobility during the nineties, or
at least of the ‘subjective’ appreciation of future mobility by individuals, based on the
observed transition matrix at each moment in time.
Table 7.a summarizes the ‘subjective’ conditional probabilities of immobile and new entrants
at the 1st and 5th quintiles, from these n power transition matrices (n=2 and n=5). The idea is
to set off in contrast the two extremes of the income distribution. We observe two interesting
facts. First, the conditional (subjective) probability of remaining in the first quintile after two
years, for individuals initially belonging to this lowest quintile, increases over the 1991-2000
period, or in other words, the conditional (subjective) probability of leapfrogging from the
lowest quintile decreases. This is also true when we look at a medium-run power transition
matrices (n=5). Second, the conditional (subjective) probability of remaining in the richest
quintile, when initially belonging to this quintile, has notoriously increased during the nineties
(from 0.49 in 1991 to 0.64 in 2000, when looking at two-year transition matrices, and a
similar evolution with the five-year transition matrices). This implies that the probability of
falling to a lower quintile for the "richest" individuals (either in the short-run or in the
medium-run) has decreased during the nineties.
Table 7.b gives the observed mean changes in log family income of the immobile and
leapfrogging individuals, again for the lowest and highest quintiles, for all one-year panels.
We observe that the income mobility of the first-quintile immobile individuals (individuals
from the [1,1] cell of the transition matrices) is always negative. On the contrary, the fifth
quintile immobile individuals ([5,5] cell) enjoy either slightly positive mobility or close to
zero mean income changes (this result being more contingent on the macroeconomic
performance of the country). If we look at new entrants, while the income loses of those
entering the first quintile stay at more or less similar rates over the period (given by the fact
that individuals cannot declare negative incomes, so the losses are obviously bounded at
zero), we do see that the income gains of new comers to the fifth-quintile ([<5,5] individuals)
dramatically increased --close to doubled-- over the period (from 0.69 in the 1991/1992 panel
to 1.11 in the 1999/2000 panel).
<Tables 7.a and 7.b around here>
The features from tables 7.a and 7.b fit into a picture that allows both for increasing inequality
and “pro-poor” income mobility. In spite of the fact that most of the upwardly mobile
individuals belong to the lowest quintiles (at a decreasing rate over time), the new lowest
quintile comers suffered negative mobility, and the immobile individuals of the lowest
quintile have not only suffered negative income mobility but indeed, at an increasing rate
during the nineties’ decade. Consequently, the lowest quintile is becoming poorer over time.
On the other hand, individuals belonging to the richest quintile are less vulnerable (i.e. their
probability of staying in the highest quintile increases) and the income gains of new comers
increases over time. Therefore, after ten years of “pro-poor” income mobility in Argentina,
we would observe an impoverishment of the poor and an enrichment of the rich.
4. Explaining Income mobility in Argentina during the 1990’s.
In previous sections we have addressed the first of our two questions, concerning the
existence and analysis of the relationship between income mobility and cross-sectional
inequality in Argentina during the nineties. We now turn to our second question, that tries to
identify if there is a structural pattern on the characteristics of different subgroups of
population that determine their mobility performance, or if belonging to one group or another
is more cycle-dependent. As already exposed, we have divided the sample population into
three groups: the ‘upwardly mobile’, the ‘immobile’ and the ‘downwardly mobile’
individuals, according to three different definitions of income movements, and we now want
to know if we can establish different group characteristics depending on the type of economic
shock that took place during the decade.
To tackle this question we first of all provide simple mobility profiles by relevant household
variables and characteristics. Since this is only a univariate analysis, we then turn to a
multivariate framework and regress our mobility variable on the set of explanatory variables.
This would give us the relevant variables determining mobility as a whole. We then turn to
the analysis of each of our different subgroups of population, that is, the ‘upwardly mobile’,
the ‘immobile’ and the ‘downwardly mobile’, and run three sets of probits, corresponding to
the three possible definitions of mobility groups used  --the ‘Most Relative’ definition, the
‘Intermediate’ definition and the ‘Least Relative’ definition. The idea is to see which
variables are important in determining each of the three possible mobility statuses, and we use
the three definitions as a robustness test on the relevant variables.
4.1. Mobility profiles.
Table 8 captures the possible unconditional relationship between our income mobility
variable, change in log adult-equivalent family income, and a set of household characteristics.
Household structure presents few interesting facts on all analyzed panels. When a man is the
highest earner in the initial year, incomes are negatively mobile (except for the 1991/92
panel). There is no clear pattern when the initial highest earner is a woman. However, until we
turn to a multivariate framework, we cannot say if it is due to the gender characteristic or to
changes in the household structure. Another structural fact is that households with a highest
earner belonging to the 30-40 age segment always experience negative mobility, except in the
initial panel, and those belonging to the 60 or more age range experience either negative or
close to zero income mobility.  Concerning schooling of the highest earner, no clear pattern
comes out from the mobility profile. If anything, we can say that in the last two panels
(1998/1999 and 1999/2000), corresponding to the starting years of the economic recession
from which Argentina is still suffering, the individuals with university education (either
complete or incomplete) are the ones with a better performance in terms of mobility. Same
unclear results about mobility appear when we look at the number of children or elderly in the
household.
Concerning the occupational status of the highest earner, we see that those households with
initially satisfied employees or self-employed suffer negative mobility, except in the
1991/1992 panel. Unsatisfied employees have no structural pattern and unsatisfied self-
employed usually suffer negative mobility (only in one panel do they suffer positive, though
close to zero mobility). Households with an employer as highest earner experience negative
income shocks in all panels. Finally, households with an initially unemployed or
inactive/discouraged highest earner experience positive mobility in all years except during the
1994-1995 episodic recession due to the Tequila crisis.
No clear conclusions can be extracted from these results before turning to a multivariate
framework. Next subsection describes the econometric model used, and describes the results
obtained.
<Table 8 around here>
4.2. Regression model and results.
To capture the causal underlying relationships between our variables, we estimate the
following econometric model. Our dependent variable is the change in log adult-equivalent
family income (∆Y). The explanatory variables are time-invariant characteristics, time-
varying base year characteristics and predicted true base year log family income. We have
excluded variables of changes in these time-varying characteristics, though they are usually
largely explicative, to avoid endogeneity problems.
iitttiti ZXwY εκγβα ++++=∆ ˆ (3)
Note that we do not observe ‘true’ initial income, but reported income. To avoid spurious
correlation and measurement error bias, we run an IV estimation using a new set of variables
for predicting ‘true’ initial income:
ittttttt WZXy ζκγβ +++=)ln( , (4)
where Wt is a set of identifying variables. The model used to obtain the individual’s predicted
base year log family income level includes as instrumental variables a series of household
characteristics, such as household’s educational intensity (defined as the mean years of
schooling of all household adult individuals), a dummy for household’s level of comfort
(considering a comfortable household that one having current water, electricity and stone
walls), a dummy for house owned or not, and a dummy capturing if the household has
domestic service or not. The regressions to obtain predicted base year log family income are
here omitted due to space limitations, though available from the authors upon request.
However, in order to give a perception of the prediction capacity of our instrumental
variables, it is important to note that R-squares of these regressions lie around 0.40/0.50.
Results from equation (3) for change in log family income are presented in table 97.
When using predicted initial log family income as indicator of base year economic position,
we see that this variable is only significant in the 1993/1994 panel. In this year-panel, this
variable has a strong negative effect on change in log family income, suggesting that for this
second year economic boom panel there is evidence of regression to the mean hypothesis. But
for the rest of our panels, this variable is not significant.
If we turn to household structure variables, we see that having initially a woman as the
household highest earner has a positive and significant effect for all years, except the first
panel8. Concerning age of the highest earner, being between 30 and 40 years old, as well as
being 60 or more years old imply having a significant negative effect on change in log family
                                                
7 Similar results were found when using changes in family income in currency units as dependent variable
(available from the authors upon request).
8 As already mentioned, 1991 was a highly inflationary year. This, together with the attrition problem (see
footnote 2) make our prediction capacity for the 1991/1992 mobility experience be very small, compared to the
income in two recession panels. Other age ranges have less significant and structural effects.
Concerning the education level of the highest earner, except in the initial panel, where our
explanatory power is small, and in the 1994/1995 panel, which corresponds to the Tequila
crisis, in general, it appears as a structural effect that higher education levels (incomplete and
complete university) are always significant and positive in determining mobility. Indeed, the
higher is the education level, the larger is the positive effect.
Surprisingly, the number of children in the household nearly plays no role in determining
income mobility. Accordingly, the number of elderly in the household also has few significant
effects. If anything, we can say that having two or more adults of 60 or more years old in the
household has a negative effect, that is strongly significant in the 1994/1995 and the
1998/1999 panels.
The way through which occupational status of the highest earner plays on income mobility
appears to be quite dependent on the economic cycle too. In general, for the three recession
panels (1994/1995, 1998/1999, 1999/2000), having a household highest earner that is initially
unemployed or inactive/discouraged implies a significant positive effect on the change in log
family income.
4.3. Identification of income ‘upwardly mobile’, ‘immobile’ and ‘downwardly mobile’.
In order to identify the correlates of each mobility population group, we estimated the
probability of becoming an upwardly mobile, an immobile and a downwardly mobile
individual, using three sets of probit models 9.  These correspond to the three different
definitions of our population groups described in Section 2. The probit models, their
coefficients, standard errors, and statistical significance of variable categories are presented in
Tables 10a-10c.
                                                                                                                                                        
rest of panels. Not obtaining similar significant results for this year does not necessarily mean that the effect
observed is not structural.
9 Ordered probits were also estimated, providing similar evidence. Results are available from the authors upon
request.
We find that the predicted log income decreases the probability of being an upwardly mobile
and increases the probability of finishing the period as and immobile. This variable is usually
insignificant in the downwardly mobile probit models, and when it is significant it follows no
pattern (the effect is negative in 1991/1992 and positive in 1993/1994). The described effects
of predicted initial log family income are robust, whatever the mobility population definition
used, though the level of significance is definition-dependent.
The influence of the occupational status of the highest earner on the mobility status seems to
be very similar with all three definitions, therefore, implying the robustness of results to
different ways of defining mobility status. Nevertheless we do not find the occupational status
variables to be very significant. When the variable is significant, some patterns are however
observed. For example, being in a household with an inactive/discouraged highest earner in
the initial period generally decreases the probability of becoming a downwardly mobile. On
the contrary, having an ‘unsatisfied self-employed’ as highest earner generally increases the
probability of becoming an income loser (the category ‘satisfied self-employed’ is seldom
significant. Concerning the individuals with an ‘unsatisfied employee’ as highest household
earner, this characteristic affects positively and in a significant way the possibility of
becoming an upwardly mobile. For some years 1991/1992 and 1998/1999, the fact of having
as highest earner an employer decreases the probability associated with the upwardly mobile
condition (in 1993/1994 the sign of this relationship is reversed).
Turning to the education level of the highest earner in the household where the individual
belongs to, we see that when it is significant, education has a clear and structural influence
over the period. In general, it has a positive effect on the probability of being an upwardly
mobile, though not always significant. And the higher the education level, the larger is this
positive effect.   A more significant effect is the fact that, in nearly all panels, having a highest
earner with some university education (either complete or incomplete) decreases the
probability of either finishing the period as a downwardly mobile. The effect of university
education on the probability of remaining immobile is less clear, probably due to the
heterogeneity of our immobile population.
Concerning the rest of variables related to the structure of the household, they are usually
year-dependent and, sometimes, even definition-dependent. This absence of a clear pattern
applies to the following characteristics: age and gender of highest earner, and the number of
children and elderly in the household.
5. – Conclusions.
The aim of this work was to analyze income mobility and inequality in Argentina during the
1990’s. In particular, we were interested in two questions. First, we wanted to analyze and
understand the existing relationship between income mobility and cross-sectional inequality.
Second, we wanted to know who were the ‘upwardly mobile’, ‘immobile’ and ‘downwardly
mobile’ individuals, trying to establish whether they had always been the same type of
individuals, or if, on the contrary, we were able to establish different group characteristics
over time.
Evidence shows that inequality has increased in Argentina during the nineties. In particular,
the income share of the lowest income quintile has dramatically diminished, while that of the
richest quintile has increased. Concerning the evolution of income mobility, we see that the
proportion of individuals that stay in the same income quintile (in particular, in the [1,1] and
[5,5] cells) has increased during the nineties. Also, when looking at mobility by population
groups, using the definitions stated in section 2, we observe that the lower the quintile, the
higher is the proportion of ‘upwardly mobile’, no matter which definition used. From the
inequality and mobility analysis, an apparent puzzle seems to be in place: the ‘upwardly
mobile’ during the nineties have been the poor, but it is the poor who have lost the most in
terms of income share.
To clarify this puzzle, we first used Galton’s statistical model, and observed that though
increasing inequality comes together with regression to the mean (beta coefficients always
less than unity), this ‘pro-poor mobility’ is decreasing since 1993/94. And indeed, using
predicted income instead of reported income as a measure of initial economic position, we
find that the micro-convergent mobility is overestimated.
We also analyzed the income dynamics of our different population groups, not only looking at
the groups themselves (i.e., the ‘upwardly mobile’, ‘immobile’ and ‘downwardly mobile’),
but also at the mean mobility within each group by income quintiles, therefore, distinguishing
between the quintile immobile individuals, the new comers and those that departed. This
additional statistical analysis shows that, in spite of the fact that most of the upwardly mobile
individuals belong to the lowest quintiles (at a decreasing rate over time), the new lowest
quintile comers (people leapfrogged by the first quintile upwardly mobile) suffered negative
mobility throughout the whole period. And the immobile individuals of the lowest quintile
have not only suffered negative income mobility but indeed, at an increasing rate during the
whole nineties’ decade. So the lowest quintile is becoming poorer over time. The inverse is
observed for the richest quintile: its ‘immobile’ individuals benefit from positive income
mobility during the economic booms and most of the recession years, while its ‘downwardly
mobile’ are replaced by new entrants that experience increasingly positive income mobility
over time.
Concerned by the determinants of income mobility we find that, once we control by
household structure, gender, age, occupational status and educational level of the highest
household earner, the “regression to the mean hypothesis” is only significant for the
1993/1994 period (a year of high GDP growth). This, when using predicted log family
income, instead of reported income, as a measure of initial economic status. Besides, we find
that when a woman is the highest earner in the initial year, income mobility is positive. Also,
households with 2 or more adults of 60 years old or more are associated with negative income
mobility. More interestingly, high education levels of the highest earner (in particular,
university education, either complete or incomplete) are in general associated with positive
income mobility. The only exceptions are exceptional years: the inflationary and growth-
restarting period (1991/1992) on one hand and the episodic recession year (1994/1995) on the
other.
The analysis from the probit models on each mobility category gives us similar conclusions
and if anything, even stronger, about the effects of higher education: more years of schooling
prevent from downward mobility and favor immobility in some years. How the occupational
status plays on mobility seems to be a more year-dependent fact. Other variables concerning
household structure, such as the number of children or elderly in the household, are generally
insignificant.
Summarizing, the increasing inequality in Argentina during the nineties has been associated
with higher volatility (short-term income mobility) in the poorest sector of the income
distribution, together with a decreasing vulnerability of the richest of the income distribution.
In fact, it seems that the observed short-run pro-poor income mobility in Argentina during the
nineties has not assured a more equitable society, at least on the medium-term. And indeed,
during this period the Argentinean society has become less mobile as a whole. Our candidate
explanation is linked to the impoverishment of the immobile poor, and of the new poor, and
with the enrichment of the very rich and the new entrants in this category, at higher rates
during the decade. Concerning the determinants, the main conclusion is that high education
seems to play an important role in protecting individuals from falling down the ladder, though
it is not always associated with an ‘upwardly mobile’ condition.
Finally, the scope of this work would suggest that the link between income mobility and
inequality is not a clearly determined functional one. A more mobile society does not
necessarily imply a less unequal society. When one of these two dimensions is emphasized
over the other, it is revealing different “a priories” about society. This is why it is important to
deeply analyze both dimensions at the same time.
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Number of observations 5632 1387 6577 2161 6568 2215 7180 2552 7056 2485
Gender of highest earner
% male 0,71 0,79 0,75 0,79 0,75 0,76 0,73 0,73 0,71 0,70
% female 0,29 0,21 0,25 0,21 0,25 0,24 0,27 0,27 0,29 0,30
Age of highest earner
Less than 30 0,20 0,17 0,19 0,17 0,19 0,16 0,19 0,18 0,20 0,21
[30,40[ 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,23 0,24 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,20
[40,50[ 0,25 0,28 0,24 0,25 0,24 0,26 0,24 0,27 0,24 0,26
[50,60[ 0,16 0,18 0,18 0,19 0,18 0,19 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,19
60 or more 0,17 0,16 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,15 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,14
Level of schooling of highest earner
No schooling or Incomplete primary 0,14 0,16 0,12 0,13 0,11 0,11 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,09
Complete primary 0,35 0,36 0,33 0,33 0,35 0,38 0,30 0,30 0,31 0,31
Incomplete secondary 0,18 0,18 0,20 0,21 0,19 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,18 0,18
Complete secondary 0,15 0,15 0,16 0,15 0,18 0,16 0,17 0,19 0,18 0,19
Incomplete University 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,06 0,06 0,09 0,08 0,10 0,10
Complete University 0,09 0,08 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,12
Number of children under 14 in the household
0 0,50 0,47 0,53 0,52 0,52 0,51 0,53 0,54 0,54 0,53
1 0,19 0,19 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,21 0,23 0,22 0,22 0,23
2 0,17 0,17 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,14
3 or more 0,14 0,17 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,12 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,10
Number of elderly over 60 in the household
0 0,69 0,72 0,68 0,69 0,69 0,71 0,72 0,72 0,72 0,74
1 0,24 0,21 0,25 0,25 0,24 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,22 0,21
2 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05
Number of income earners in the household
0 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,10 0,09
1 0,33 0,39 0,34 0,36 0,36 0,39 0,36 0,37 0,34 0,35
2 0,32 0,40 0,35 0,32 0,36 0,35 0,36 0,38 0,36 0,36
3 or more 0,36 0,21 0,21 0,24 0,20 0,19 0,21 0,19 0,21 0,19
Occupational category of highest earner
'Satisfied' employee 0,43 0,50 0,40 0,39 0,37 0,39 0,37 0,39 0,37 0,38
'Unsatisfied' employee 0,19 0,20 0,18 0,20 0,21 0,21 0,25 0,26 0,26 0,26
Employer 0,04 0,04 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04
'Satisfied' Self-employed 0,11 0,10 0,13 0,13 0,11 0,12 0,09 0,08 0,07 0,07
'Unsatisfied' Self-employed 0,05 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,08
Unemployed 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,05 0,05
Inactive/Discouraged 0,18 0,12 0,13 0,12 0,15 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,13 0,12
Mean family income by quintiles
1st quintile 81,12 119,04 120,00 127,43 115,46 110,56 97,06 96,68 84,17 86,19
2nd quintile 211,97 213,00 275,81 269,49 265,23 264,72 235,35 234,66 219,73 218,71
3rd quintile 317,66 324,14 414,40 411,61 397,22 396,81 371,15 374,76 350,32 345,49
4th quintile 484,96 488,86 621,42 623,88 597,83 591,75 600,72 592,77 556,18 556,75
5th quintile 1200,31 1162,45 1313,30 1302,01 1355,94 1352,40 1457,57 1486,27 1347,11 1288,58
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Source: Authors' calculations from EPH data.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Gini coefficient 0,45 0,44 0,44 0,46 0,47 0,48 0,47 0,48 0,48 0,49 0,07
(using adult-equiv. family income)
Gini coefficient 0,48 0,47 0,46 0,49 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,51 0,50 0,51 0,07
(using per capita family income)
Income shares by initial income quintile
1st quintile 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 -0,31
2nd 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 -0,11
3rd 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,13 -0,02
4th 0,21 0,22 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,22 0,04
5th 0,51 0,50 0,49 0,51 0,53 0,53 0,52 0,53 0,52 0,53 0,03
Income shares by initial income decile
1st decile 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,46
2nd 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 -0,21
3rd 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 -0,16
4th 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 -0,07
5th 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 -0,04
6th 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,00
7th 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,03
8th 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,06
9th 0,16 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,09
10th 0,35 0,33 0,33 0,35 0,36 0,36 0,36 0,36 0,35 0,36 0,01
Source: Authors' calculations from EPH data.
1991-2000 % 
variation
Table 2.a: Inequality trends in Argentina, using cross-sectional survey data (period 1991-2000).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1994 1995 1998 1999 1999 2000
Gini coefficient 0,42 0,44 0,43 0,44 0,45 0,47 0,48 0,49 0,47 0,47 0,12
(using adult-equiv. family income)
Gini coefficient 0,45 0,47 0,45 0,46 0,47 0,48 0,50 0,51 0,49 0,49 0,08
(using per capita family income)
Income shares by initial income quintile
1st quintile 0,06 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 -0,43
2nd 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,09 -0,13
3rd 0,14 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 -0,04
4th 0,21 0,22 0,23 0,23 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,22 0,08
5th 0,48 0,49 0,47 0,49 0,49 0,52 0,52 0,53 0,52 0,51 0,06
Income shares by initial income decile
1st decile 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,67
2nd 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 -0,25
3rd 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 -0,17
4th 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 -0,10
5th 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 -0,04
6th 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 -0,02
7th 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,04
8th 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,10
9th 0,15 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,17 0,17 0,17 0,18 0,18 0,21
10th 0,33 0,33 0,31 0,33 0,33 0,35 0,36 0,36 0,34 0,33 0,00
Source: Authors' calculations from EPH data.
Table 2.b: Inequality trends in Argentina, using year-panel subsamples.
Panel 1991/1992 Panel 1993/1994 Panel 1994/1995 Panel 1998/1999 Panel 1999/2000 1991-2000 % 
variation
mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
By Initial Income Quintile
1st 0,05 0,09 0,91 0,11 0,87 0,11 0,63 0,1 0,95 0,11
2nd -0,04 0,06 -0,07 0,05 -0,28 0,06 -0,05 0,04 -0,09 0,05
3rd -0,43 0,1 -0,22 0,05 -0,2 0,04 -0,27 0,05 -0,2 0,04
4th -0,33 0,08 -0,35 0,06 -0,38 0,06 -0,22 0,03 -0,3 0,05
5th -0,39 0,08 -0,43 0,06 -0,47 0,06 -0,35 0,05 -0,35 0,06
By Initial Income Decile
1st 0,39 0,1 1,66 0,18 1,71 0,19 1,28 0,17 1,98 0,18
2nd -0,31 0,14 0,1 0,09 0 0,06 -0,03 0,07 -0,11 0,08
3rd 0,04 0,08 -0,14 0,08 -0,3 0,08 -0,02 0,06 -0,07 0,07
4th -0,13 0,07 0 0,06 -0,26 0,07 -0,08 0,05 -0,12 0,07
5th -0,51 0,15 -0,08 0,04 -0,19 0,06 -0,38 0,08 -0,22 0,07
6th -0,36 0,13 -0,35 0,1 -0,22 0,05 -0,17 0,04 -0,18 0,04
7th -0,24 0,09 -0,41 0,08 -0,26 0,06 -0,25 0,06 -0,31 0,08
8th -0,42 0,12 -0,3 0,08 -0,5 0,1 -0,18 0,04 -0,28 0,06
9th -0,39 0,14 -0,39 0,08 -0,54 0,09 -0,22 0,07 -0,43 0,1
10th -0,38 0,1 -0,46 0,08 -0,39 0,07 -0,48 0,08 -0,28 0,05
Source: Authors' calculations from EPH data.
Table 3: Mean change in log family income, by initial economic position.
1999/20001991/1992 1993/1994 1994/1995 1998/1999
 1991 \ 1992 1 2 3 4 5
1 49,64 29,5 13,67 5,76 1,44
2 20,07 40,51 22,63 14,96 1,82
3 14,49 17,75 34,42 26,81 6,52
4 9,52 8,79 24,91 35,16 21,61
5 6,55 3,27 4 19,27 66,91
1993 \ 1994 1 2 3 4 5
1 50,82 21,21 13,52 9,32 5,13
2 24,24 37,53 25,87 9,32 3,03
3 11,71 26 35,83 18,97 7,49
4 8,43 11,24 18,27 38,17 23,89
5 4,67 4,21 6,54 24,07 60,51
1994 \ 1995 1 2 3 4 5
1 53,51 26,08 12,7 3,4 4,31
2 22,68 36,73 28,57 9,98 2,04
3 11,54 18,1 34,84 29,41 6,11
4 6,83 15,26 19,13 37,13 21,64
5 5,68 3,64 4,55 20,68 65,45
1998 \ 1999 1 2 3 4 5
1 58,51 24,46 11,55 2,35 3,13
2 20,55 40,9 27,4 8,81 2,35
3 11,76 20,98 38,43 26,86 1,96
4 5,48 9,98 20,94 45,4 18,2
5 3,73 3,54 2,36 16,11 74,26
1999 \ 2000 1 2 3 4 5
1 56,94 25,15 10,26 5,63 2,01
2 25,15 35,41 27,97 9,05 2,41
3 8,85 29,98 36,62 22,33 2,21
4 5 8,6 22,8 48,8 14,8
5 4,25 0,61 2,23 13,97 78,95
Table 4.b. Percent of Sample in 1994 Log Family Income Quintile, 
Conditional on 1993 Log Family Income Quintile
Tables 4a-4e: Family Income Transition Matrices
Table 4.e. Percent of Sample in 2000 Log Family Income Quintile, 
Table 4.a. Percent of Sample in 1992 Log Family Income Quintile, 
Conditional on 1991 Log Family Income Quintile
Conditional on 1999 Log Family Income Quintile
Table 4.c. Percent of Sample in 1995 Log Family Income Quintile, 
Conditional on 1994 Log Family Income Quintile
Table 4.d. Percent of Sample in 1999 Log Family Income Quintile, 
Conditional on 1998 Log Family Income Quintile












UM IM DM UM IM DM UM IM DM UM IM DM UM IM DM
Most Relative' mobility definition
1st quintile 62,2 29,5 8,3 58,4 29,3 12,2 56,0 37,3 6,8 51,9 37,0 11,2 55,5 31,8 12,7
2nd quintile 49,5 28,3 22,2 45,3 25,2 29,6 43,1 24,6 32,3 42,9 26,6 30,5 48,5 20,3 31,2
3rd quintile 41,7 34,4 35,6 38,4 17,4 44,2 39,4 21,9 38,7 35,9 23,9 40,2 34,0 19,1 46,9
4th quintile 31,3 33,1 35,6 27,4 24,4 48,3 31,5 20,0 48,5 26,2 30,1 43,6 25,2 29,4 45,4
5th quintile 9,8 58,0 32,3 10,4 41,9 47,7 6,1 53,2 40,7 9,8 57,2 33,0 11,5 57,3 31,2
Intermediate' mobility definition
1st quintile 70,5 14,8 14,8 68,1 9,9 21,9 63,7 17,4 19,0 67,3 9,2 23,5 68,8 7,7 23,5
2nd quintile 55,9 21,9 22,2 56,8 8,6 34,6 46,1 15,1 38,8 52,6 5,5 41,9 56,1 2,0 41,9
3rd quintile 49,6 26,5 23,9 40,5 11,1 48,4 39,4 14,4 46,2 44,1 4,3 51,6 44,9 0,4 54,7
4th quintile 39,9 24,5 35,6 31,3 10,4 58,2 31,9 11,0 57,1 43,3 4,3 52,5 36,0 4,6 59,4
5th quintile 33,7 30,8 35,5 26,9 12,5 60,7 26,6 18,0 55,5 38,5 10,6 50,9 37,7 3,9 58,5
Least Relative' mobility definition
1st quintile 70,5 13,7 15,8 68,1 9,7 22,2 63,7 15,4 21,0 67,7 7,4 24,9 69,6 5,8 24,6
2nd quintile 55,9 21,9 22,2 57,5 7,9 34,6 46,1 14,7 39,3 52,6 5,5 41,9 58,0 0,0 42,1
3rd quintile 50,7 25,4 23,9 40,5 10,2 49,3 39,4 14,0 46,6 44,1 4,3 51,6 45,3 0,0 54,7
4th quintile 41,4 23,0 35,6 31,3 10,4 58,2 31,9 10,6 57,5 43,6 3,9 52,5 38,4 0,4 61,2





















































1991/1992 1993/1994 1994/1995 1998/1999 1999/2000
a) Using log of reported income for initial economic position
Beta 0,72 0,36 0,40 0,51 0,45
Constant 1,44 3,75 3,42 2,75 3,10
Sigma-squared 1,89 1,46 1,52 1,44 1,64
Var(logYt) 0,52 1,38 1,77 1,73 2,13
Var(logYt+1) 2,14 1,67 1,88 1,91 2,08
R-squared 0,13 0,12 0,15 0,25 0,21
b) Using log of predicted income for initial economic position
Beta 0,86 0,40 0,52 0,69 0,61
Constant 0,61 3,49 2,68 1,73 2,18
Sigma-squared 1,96 1,55 1,58 1,56 1,74
Var(logYpredt) 0,26 0,65 0,80 0,72 0,90
Var(logYt+1) 2,14 1,67 1,88 1,91 2,08
R-squared 0,10 0,07 0,13 0,18 0,16
1991/1992 1993/1994 1994/1995 1998/1999 1999/2000
a) Using log of reported income for initial economic position by age groups
Beta
     less than 30 0,76 0,27 0,41 0,64 0,56
     30-40 0,79 0,48 0,53 0,41 0,55
     40-50 0,67 0,31 0,36 0,48 0,37
     50-60 0,75 0,43 0,34 0,60 0,39
     60 or more 0,64 0,45 0,38 0,58 0,46
b) Using log of predicted income for initial economic position by age groups
Beta
     less than 30 0,92 1,05 0,61 0,88 0,64
     30-40 1,16 0,56 0,71 0,74 0,83
     40-50 0,79 0,42 0,52 0,69 0,56
     50-60 0,46 0,45 0,36 0,70 0,53
     60 or more 0,75 0,23 0,40 0,35 0,54
c) Using log of reported income for initial economic position by initial quintile*
Beta
1st quintile 0,35 0,17 0,15 0,22 0,19
2nd quintile 0,68 0,46 0,45 0,64 0,86
3rd quintile 0,46 0,61 0,80 0,61 0,83
4th quintile 0,83 0,89 0,82 0,75 0,58
5th quintile 0,75 0,66 0,99 0,88 0,90
Table 6.a: Estimates from Galton's model of regression towards the mean (total population)
Table 6.b: Estimates from Galton's model, by age groups and initial income quintiles
*Division of initial income quintiles is based on predicted income.
1991-1992 1993-1994 1994-1995 1998-1999 1999-2000
Probability of staying in the first-quintile (2-
year period) 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.40 0.40
Probability of staying in the first-quintile (5-
year period) 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.25
Probability of staying in the fifth-quintile (2-
year period) 0.49 0.42 0.47 0.57 0.64
Probability of staying in the fifth-quintile (5-
year period) 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.33 0.40
1991-1992 1993-1994 1994-1995 1998-1999 1999-2000
Mean change in log family income for 1st-
quintile immobiles -0.63 -0,15 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12
Mean change in log family income for 1st-
quintile new entrants -2.82 -2,01 -2,3 -1.97 -2.16
Mean change in log family income for 5th-
quintile immobiles 0,07 0,02 -0,03 0.01 0.00
Mean change in log family income for 5th-
quintile new entrants 0.69 0,93 1,26 1.24 1.11
Table 7.a: Conditional Probabilities from  n-power transition matrices (n=2 & n=5).
Table 7.b: Mean change in log family income, first and fifth quintile.
mean se share mean se share mean se share mean se share mean se share
Gender of highest earner
male 0.07 0.02 0,78 -0.05 0.02 0,81 -0.13 0.01 0,78 -0.05 0.01 0,75 -0.04 0.01 0,71
female -0.08 0.03 0,22 0.16 0.03 0,19 -0.03 0.03 0,22 0.02 0.03 0,25 0.03 0.02 0,29
Age of highest earner
Less than 30 0.01 0.04 0,17 0.08 0.04 0,17 -0.03 0.04 0,17 -0.04 0.03 0,18 0.06 0.03 0,22
[30,40[ 0.08 0.04 0,22 -0.06 0.02 0,23 -0.17 0.03 0,25 -0.03 0.03 0,20 -0.13 0.03 0,21
[40,50[ 0.11 0.03 0,27 -0.08 0.03 0,25 -0.13 0.03 0,26 0.01 0.02 0,27 -0.06 0.02 0,26
[50,60[ 0.01 0.03 0,17 0.03 0.03 0,19 -0.09 0.03 0,18 -0.11 0.03 0,20 0.04 0.03 0,19
60 or more -0.06 0.04 0,17 0.01 0.03 0,17 -0.09 0.04 0,14 0.02 0.03 0,15 -0.00 0.03 0,13
Schooling level of highest earner
No schooling/Incomp. primary 0.06 0.04 0,16 0.01 0.04 0,12 -0.03 0.04 0,10 -0.04 0.05 0,10 -0.06 0.04 0,09
Complete primary 0.05 0.03 0,36 -0.06 0.02 0,33 -0.16 0.02 0,38 -0.03 0.02 0,29 0.00 0.02 0,30
Incomplete secondary 0.07 0.03 0,19 -0.03 0.03 0,20 -0.15 0.04 0,21 -0.04 0.03 0,21 -0.10 0.03 0,18
Complete secondary -0.04 0.04 0,15 0.05 0.04 0,15 -0.01 0.03 0,16 -0.04 0.03 0,19 -0.05 0.02 0,19
Incomplete University 0.09 0.08 0,07 0.02 0.04 0,10 -0.13 0.05 0,07 -0.01 0.04 0,08 0.10 0.03 0,10
Complete University -0.04 0.08 0,09 0.01 0.06 0,10 -0.05 0.04 0,09 0.01 0.04 0,12 0.00 0.04 0,13
Number of children in hh (less than 14)
0 0.01 0.02 0,48 0.01 0.02 0,52 -0.08 0.02 0,50 -0.03 0.02 0,55 0.03 0.02 0,53
1 0.03 0.03 0,18 -0.11 0.03 0,20 0.00 0.03 0,22 -0.03 0.02 0,22 -0.03 0.02 0,23
2 0.02 0.04 0,17 0.02 0.03 0,16 -0.31 0.04 0,16 -0.07 0.03 0,15 -0.08 0.03 0,14
3 or more 0.16 0.04 0,16 0.02 0.04 0,12 -0.19 0.04 0,12 0.07 0.05 0,08 -0.18 0.05 0,10
Number of elderly in hh (more than 60)
0 0.07 0.02 0,71 -0.01 0.02 0,68 -0.13 0.02 0,70 -0.03 0.01 0,72 0.00 0.01 0,75
1 -0.00 0.04 0,22 -0.04 0.03 0,25 -0.09 0.03 0,24 -0.05 0.03 0,23 -0.10 0.03 0,20
2 or more -0.20 0.07 0,07 0.09 0.06 0,07 -0.03 0.05 0,06 -0.01 0.05 0,05 -0.10 0.04 0,05
Occupational status of highest earner
'Satisfied' employee 0.06 0.02 0,50 -0.01 0.02 0,41 -0.13 0.02 0,41 -0.02 0.02 0,40 -0.06 0.02 0,40
'Unsatisfied' employee 0.05 0.03 0,20 0.06 0.03 0,20 -0.00 0.03 0,22 -0.02 0.03 0,26 0.06 0.02 0,26
Employer -0.13 0.12 0,04 -0.16 0.08 0,06 -0.30 0.06 0,05 -0.31 0.06 0,05 -0.28 0.07 0,04
'Satisfied' Self-employed 0.06 0.05 0,10 -0.12 0.03 0,13 -0.21 0.04 0,12 -0.07 0.04 0,09 -0.09 0.05 0,08
'Unsatisfied' Self-employed -0.07 0.08 0,04 -0.18 0.05 0,07 -0.13 0.08 0,07 0.01 0.06 0,07 -0.04 0.04 0,08
Unemployed 0.10 0.12 0,01 0.30 0.08 0,02 -0.31 0.10 0,03 0.18 0.09 0,03 0.08 0.09 0,04
Inactive/Discouraged 0.02 0.04 0,12 0.09 0.04 0,11 -0.02 0.04 0,12 0.02 0.04 0,11 0.05 0.04 0,10
1999-2000
Table 8: Mobility Profiles.
1991-1992 1993-1994 1994-1995 1998-1999
Predicted initial log  family income 0,26 -0,64 *** -0,03 -0,12 0,07
-(1,13) (4.20) -(0,15) -(0,69) -(0,45)
Gender of highest earner -0,07 0,24 ** 0,14 * 0,21 ** 0,18 **
-(0,69) (2.25) (1.77) (2.50) (2.37)
Age of highest earner
Less than 30 (omitted)
[30,40[ 0,06 -0,03 -0,18 * 0,04 -0,25 ***
-(0,50) -(0,24) (1.87) -(0,46) (2.73)
[40,50[ -0,08 -0,03 -0,09 0,10 -0,18 **
-(0,70) -(0,22) -(0,98) -(1,29) (2.10)
[50,60[ -0,35 ** -0,04 0,03 0,02 0,13
(2.48) -(0,30) -(0,33) -(0,19) -(1,31)
60 or more -0,32 0,02 -0,70 *** -0,28 -0,71 ***
-(1,55) -(0,10) (3.02) -(1,46) (3.00)
Level of schooling of highest earner
No schooling/Incomp. Primary (omitted)
Complete primary -0,14 -0,18 * -0,17 0,23 ** 0,26 ***
-(1,23) (1.87) -(1,52) (2.05) (2.32)
Incomplete secondary -0,04 0,20 * 0,00 0,31 ** 0,17
-(0,26) (1.79) -(0,03) (2.37) -(1,32)
Complete secondary -0,46 ** 0,22 * 0,34 ** 0,38 ** 0,31 **
(2.34) (1.66) (2.14) (2.51) (2.00)
Incomplete University -0,25 0,25 0,01 0,39 * 0,36 **
-(1,00) -(1,35) -(0,06) (1.93) (2.03)
Complete University -0,36 0,45 ** 0,05 0,46 * 0,44 *
-(1,34) (2.31) -(0,18) (1.86)* (1.90)*
Occupational status of highest earner
Satisfied' employee (omitted)
'Unsatisfied' employee -0,01 -0,26 *** 0,02 -0,13 0,04
-(0,11) (3.07) -(0,21) (1.76)* -(0,59)
Employer -0,49 * 0,06 -0,31 * -0,07 -0,22 *
(1.86) -(0,33) (1.91) -(0,67) (1.79)
'Satisfied' Self-employed -0,37 ** -0,11 -0,24 ** -0,01 -0,11
(2.09) -(1,22) (2.42) -(0,16) -(0,98)
'Unsatisfied' Self-employed 0,01 -0,30 *** -0,14 -0,15 -0,22 *
-(0,07) (2.90) -(1,18) -(1,36) (1.89)*
Unemployed 0,33 -0,03 0,66  0,55 ** 0,75 **
(1.68)* -(0,11) -(1,58) (2.02) (2.41)
Inactive/Discouraged 0,48 *** 0,09 1,15 *** 0,82 *** 1,54 ***
(2.94) -(0,30) (3.45) (3.13) (5.15)
Number of children under 14 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 -0,06 0,13 0,18 ** -0,02 0,19 **
-(0,44) -(1,43) (2.02) -(0,18) (2.21)
2 -0,08 0,01 -0,09 0,12 0,07
-(0,54) -(0,14) -(0,93) -(1,01) -(0,72)
3 or more 0,10 -0,41 ** -0,14 -0,06 0,05
-(0,48) (2.42) -(1,01) -(0,33) -(0,31)
Number of elderly over 60 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 0,24 * -0,13 0,31 *** 0,09 -0,15
(1.70) -(1,47) (4.09) -(0,95) -(1,58)
2 or more -0,27 -0,27 -0,43 ** -0,61 *** -0,16
-(1,31) -(1,47) (2.04) (3.36) -(0,70)
Number of income earners in hh. -0,11 ** -0,01 -0,27 *** -0,24 *** -0,37 ***
(2.57) -(0,08) (3.09) (3.17) (4.48)
Constant -1,30 3,76 *** 0,48 0,63 -0,12
-(0,99) (4.68) -(0,51) -(0,73) -(0,15)
Number obs. 1387 2161 2215 2552 2485
F-test
R-squared 0,04 0,17 0,15 0,13 0,16
Adj R-squared 0,02 0,13 0,15 0,12 0,15
Standard errors in brackets; *=significant at the 10% prob. Level; **=significant at 5% ;  ***=significant at 1%. 
Table 9: Regression of Change in Log Family Income.
1991/1992 1993/1994 1994/1995 1998/1999 1999/2000
Predicted initial log  family income -0,37 * 0,77 *** -0,38 * -0,70 *** 0,19 0,58 *** -0,03 0,02 0,10 -0,12 -0,08 0,23 -0,32 *** 0,24 ** 0,09
Gender of highest earner -0,24 *** 0,00 0,26 *** 0,08 -0,15 0,03 -0,02 -0,04 0,05 -0,05 0,18 ** -0,18 ** -0,03 -0,03 0,05
Age of highest earner
Less than 30 (omitted)
[30,40[ 0,20 * -0,23 ** 0,03 -0,33 *** 0,26 *** 0,07 -0,24 *** 0,20 ** 0,02 -0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,39 *** 0,29 *** 0,13
[40,50[ 0,06 -0,08 0,06 -0,16 * 0,06 0,11 -0,17 ** 0,10 0,06 0,21 *** -0,28 *** 0,08 -0,16 ** 0,22 *** -0,01
[50,60[ 0,11 -0,46 *** 0,39 *** -0,04 0,10 -0,06 -0,27 *** 0,40 *** -0,15 0,11 -0,21 ** 0,12 -0,14 0,39 *** -0,26 ***
60 or more 0,27 -0,85 *** 0,66 *** 0,20 -0,26 0,00 -0,59 *** 0,47 ** 0,14 0,38 ** -0,05 -0,32 ** -0,35 ** 0,35 ** 0,01
Occupational status of highest earner
Satisfied' employee (omitted)
'Unsatisfied' employee -0,12 0,25 *** -0,11 -0,03 0,12 -0,04 0,23 *** 0,02 -0,24 *** 0,10 -0,07 -0,02 0,27 *** -0,07 -0,20 ***
Employer -0,27 -0,23 0,50 ** 0,16 -0,17 -0,06 -0,18 -0,04 0,13 -0,40 *** 0,16 0,12 -0,26 * 0,10 0,04
'Satisfied' Self-employed 0,01 -0,09 0,10 -0,04 -0,07 0,10 0,04 -0,36 *** 0,24 *** -0,13 0,03 0,09 0,17 -0,08 -0,09
'Unsatisfied' Self-employed -0,13 -0,05 0,26 -0,22 ** -0,27 ** 0,44 *** -0,11 -0,02 0,16 0,03 -0,19 * 0,17 -0,22 ** 0,19 * 0,04
Unemployed -1,02 ** 1,24 *** -0,25 -0,59 ** 0,26 0,37 -0,06 0,28 -0,14 0,08 -0,27 0,18 -0,09 0,27 -0,25
Inactive/Discouraged 0,11 0,68 *** -0,89 *** -0,70 *** 0,25 0,49 ** 0,24 0,09 -0,31 -0,03 -0,17 0,19 0,17 0,23 -0,45 **
Level of schooling of highest earner
No schooling/Incomp. Primary (omitted)
Complete primary 0,17 -0,31 *** 0,20 * 0,09 -0,19 ** 0,09 -0,16 -0,05 0,22 ** -0,13 0,34 *** -0,19 ** 0,38 *** -0,14 -0,25 ***
Incomplete secondary 0,23 * -0,30 ** 0,10 0,36 *** -0,44 *** 0,00 -0,01 -0,27 ** 0,25 ** 0,03 0,20 * -0,21 ** 0,18 0,03 -0,20 *
Complete secondary 0,19 -0,54 *** 0,39 ** 0,44 *** -0,04 -0,41 *** -0,07 0,07 -0,03 -0,13 0,50 *** -0,37 *** 0,31 ** 0,14 -0,45 ***
Incomplete University 0,27 -0,88 *** 0,66 *** 0,36 ** 0,13 -0,54 *** -0,10 0,11 0,00 -0,19 0,67 *** -0,52 *** 0,58 *** 0,08 -0,70 ***
Complete University -0,03 -0,64 ** 0,62 ** 0,51 *** 0,15 -0,73 *** -0,48 ** 0,80 *** -0,53 *** -0,14 0,90 *** -0,85 *** 0,51 *** 0,14 -0,72 ***
Number of children under 14 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 0,03 -0,31 *** 0,31 *** -0,09 -0,15 * 0,21 *** 0,28 *** -0,19 ** -0,05 -0,14 * -0,11 0,27 *** -0,14 * -0,11 0,23 ***
2 0,02 -0,12 0,15 0,08 -0,07 -0,02 -0,09 -0,17 * 0,24 *** -0,15 -0,08 0,27 ** -0,36 *** 0,20 ** 0,15 *
3 or more -0,08 0,03 0,09 -0,23 -0,02 0,28 ** -0,05 0,09 0,03 -0,27 ** 0,15 0,13 -0,40 *** 0,02 0,36 ***
Number of elderly over 60 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 -0,30 ** 0,37 *** -0,10 0,04 -0,07 0,03 0,47 *** -0,39 *** -0,12 0,07 -0,24 *** 0,18 ** -0,23 *** 0,13 0,11
2 or more -1,21 *** 0,74 *** 0,36 0,25 0,29 * -0,51 *** 0,27 * -0,14 -0,17 -0,49 *** 0,18 0,37 ** -0,46 *** 0,27 * 0,16
Number of income earners in hh. -0,08 -0,18 *** 0,27 *** 0,10 -0,13 * -0,01 -0,26 *** -0,01 0,22 *** -0,27 *** 0,06 0,19 *** -0,10 -0,10 0,19 ***
Constant 2,00 * -4,08 *** 0,49 3,51 *** -1,36 -3,84 *** 0,36 -0,67 -1,44 * 0,75 -0,24 -2,03 *** 1,53 ** -2,02 *** -0,94
Number obs. 1376 1376 2140 2140 2140 2203 2203 2203 2552 2552 2552 2485 2485 2485
Log-likelihood -865,77 -853,3 -1313,1 -1202,2 -1302,6 -1342,4 -1281,9 -1300,8 -1528,2 -1580,5 -1494,3 -1466,8 -1476,5 -1484
LR chi2(3) 110,05 100,2 176,75 111,8 197,69 175,12 167,2 211,99 198,27 137,01 199,31 283,13 145,25 200,63
Pseudo R2 0,0598 0,0555 0,0631 0,0444 0,0705 0,0612 0,0612 0,0753 0,0609 0,0415 0,0625 0,088 0,0469 0,0633
Standard errors omitted to save space; *=significant at the 10% prob. Level; **=significant at 5% ;  ***=significant at 1%. 
Table 10.a: Probits using 'Most Relative' definition of population groups.
1991/1992 1993/1994 1994/1995 1998/1999 1999/2000
winner immob loser winner immob loser winner immob loser winner immob loser winner immob loser
Predicted initial log  family income -0,051 0,684 *** -0,506 ** -0,869 *** 0,728 *** 0,595 *** 0,006 0,289 -0,15 0,076 -0,202 -0,006 -0,299 ** 0,76 *** 0,203
Gender of highest earner -0,3 *** 0,066 0,271 *** -0,078 0,004 0,082 -0,057 0,173 ** -0,055 0,127 * -0,251 ** -0,055 -0,067 0,063 0,06
Age of highest earner
Less than 30 (omitted)
[30,40[ 0,013 -0,086 0,062 -0,185 * -0,009 0,187 * -0,239 *** 0,196 0,158 * -0,063 -0,147 0,11 -0,261 *** 0,695 *** 0,172 **
[40,50[ 0,021 -0,095 0,071 -0,1 -0,085 0,139 -0,067 0,329 *** -0,098 0,139 * -0,109 -0,108 -0,076 0,292 0,057
[50,60[ -0,038 -0,349 *** 0,338 *** 0,036 -0,05 -0,032 -0,125 0,452 *** -0,125 0,085 -0,09 -0,056 0,007 0,484 ** -0,081
60 or more 0,077 -0,634 *** 0,475 ** 0,342 * -0,91 *** 0,031 -0,323 * 0,043 0,338 * 0,293 ** -0,318 -0,194 -0,263 0,452 0,242
Occupational status of highest earner
Satisfied' employee (omitted)
'Unsatisfied' employee -0,129 0,277 *** -0,092 0,004 0,057 -0,026 0,162 ** 0,127 -0,23 *** 0,102 -0,075 -0,08 0,178 *** 0,117 -0,192 ***
Employer -0,368 * -0,148 0,53 ** 0,259 ** -0,503 ** -0,078 -0,209 -0,207 0,289 ** -0,355 *** 0,007 0,341 *** -0,112 -0,415 0,161
'Satisfied' Self-employed 0,036 -0,22 0,13 -0,226 *** 0,059 0,167 ** -0,022 -0,463 *** 0,238 *** -0,056 -0,14 0,091 0,076 -0,574 * -0,006
'Unsatisfied' Self-employed -0,034 -0,343 * 0,319 * -0,34 *** 0,188 0,274 ** -0,257 ** -0,283 * 0,38 *** -0,094 -0,009 0,102 -0,161 0,331 0,12
Unemployed -0,078 0,571 -0,393 -0,695 *** 0,811 ** 0,379 0,118 0,617 -0,468 0,173 -0,006 -0,186 -0,269 1,338 *** 0,003
Inactive/Discouraged 0,134 0,6 *** -0,72 *** -1,039 *** 1,456 *** 0,401 0,317 0,527 * -0,668 *** 0,18 0,234 -0,287 0,132 1,401 *** -0,471 **
Level of schooling of highest earner
No schooling/Incomp. Primary (omitted)
Complete primary 0,01 -0,149 0,144 0,017 -0,051 0,005 -0,184 ** -0,035 0,211 ** -0,022 0,466 *** -0,124 0,338 *** -0,299 -0,311 ***
Incomplete secondary 0,118 -0,266 * 0,09 0,265 *** -0,452 *** -0,097 -0,002 -0,324 ** 0,183 -0,008 0,229 -0,064 0,119 0,031 -0,159
Complete secondary -0,156 -0,33 * 0,473 *** 0,507 *** -0,258 -0,397 *** 0,01 -0,209 0,092 0,051 0,45 ** -0,193 0,286 ** -0,257 -0,279 **
Incomplete University -0,041 -0,729 *** 0,662 *** 0,534 *** -0,229 -0,479 *** 0,046 -0,498 ** 0,234 -0,136 0,457 0,005 0,706 *** -0,247 -0,749 ***
Complete University 0,133 -1,01 *** 0,697 ** 0,938 *** -0,345 -0,878 *** -0,008 -0,05 0,013 -0,005 1,014 *** -0,339 0,555 *** -0,566 -0,537 ***
Number of children under 14 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 -0,077 -0,262 ** 0,301 *** -0,187 ** -0,019 0,196 ** 0,176 ** 0,14 -0,236 *** -0,117 0,102 0,091 -0,207 *** -0,219 0,233 ***
2 -0,089 0,019 0,109 -0,055 0,157 -0,017 -0,13 -0,003 0,125 -0,028 0,1 -0,001 -0,419 *** 0,092 0,408 ***
3 or more -0,028 0,15 -0,078 -0,304 ** 0,175 0,239 * -0,042 0,29 * -0,101 -0,015 -0,055 0,035 -0,58 *** 0,084 0,573 ***
Number of elderly over 60 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 -0,183 0,252 * -0,006 0,038 0,041 -0,043 0,312 *** -0,033 -0,292 *** -0,032 *** -0,026 0,031  -0,084 -0,191 0,094
2 or more -0,958 *** 0,697 *** 0,38 * 0,291 * 0,022 -0,301 * -0,086 0,372 * -0,196 -0,549 *** 0,361 0,445 *** -0,178 -0,553 * 0,253
Number of income earners in hh. -0,12 ** -0,16 *** 0,268 *** 0,162 ** -0,354 *** -0,023 -0,249 *** -0,163 * 0,33 *** -0,327 -0,02 0,337 *** -0,071 -0,793 *** 0,193 ***
Constant 0,734 -4,181 *** 1,317 4,672 *** -4,831 *** -3,622 *** 0,269 -2,73 *** 0,16 0,044 -0,644 -0,55 1,742 *** -5,363 *** -1,433 **
Number obs. 1376 1376 1376 2140 2140 2140 2203 2203 2203 2552 2552 2552 2485 2485 2485
Log-likelihood -919,54 -713,46 -755,37 -1384,5 -690,87 -1379,6 -1427,5 -877,18 -1401,9 -1680,3 -593,31 -1639,6 -1610,1 -324,97 -1576
LR chi2(3) 68,37 68 75,1 173,32 74,38 182,53 139,53 92,59 211,56 176,63 52,21 222,77 222,92 137,11 287,49
Pseudo R2 0,0358 0,0455 0,0474 0,0589 0,0511 0,062 0,0466 0,0501 0,0702 0,0499 0,0421 0,0636 0,0647 0,1742 0,0836
Standard errors omitted to save space; *=significant at the 10% prob. Level; **=significant at 5% ;  ***=significant at 1%. 
Table 10.b: Probits using 'Intermediate' definition of population groups.
1991/1992 1993/1994 1994/1995 1998/1999 1999/2000
winner immob loser winner immob loser winner immob loser winner immob loser winner immob loser
Predicted initial log  family income 0,09 0,50 ** -0,49 ** -0,86 *** 0,96 *** 0,56 *** 0,03 0,15 -0,10 0,13 -0,29 -0,04 -0,25 ** -0,56 0,28 **
Gender of highest earner -0,34 *** 0,11 0,28 *** -0,10 0,10 0,07 -0,04 0,16 * -0,06 0,12 -0,26 ** -0,06 -0,09 0,56 * 0,08
Age of highest earner
Less than 30 (omitted)
[30,40[ 0,05 -0,13 0,07 -0,19 * 0,09 0,15 -0,24 *** 0,21 0,15 -0,10 -0,05 0,11 -0,22 *** 2,36 *** 0,21 **
[40,50[ 0,08 -0,22 * 0,10 -0,08 -0,05 0,10 -0,04 0,30 *** -0,10 0,15 * -0,14 -0,11 -0,08 1,68 ** 0,06
[50,60[ -0,05 -0,36 *** 0,35 *** 0,05 0,01 -0,07 -0,09 0,46 *** -0,14 0,08 -0,05 -0,07 0,02 2,42 -0,08
60 or more 0,26 -1,01 *** 0,52 *** 0,34 * -1,00 *** 0,03 -0,36 ** 0,20 0,29 0,25 -0,28 -0,18 -0,21 9,97 0,18
Occupational status of highest earner
Satisfied' employee (omitted)
'Unsatisfied' employee -0,10 0,25 ** -0,09 0,00 0,12 -0,04 0,16 ** 0,10 -0,21 *** 0,09 -0,03 -0,08 0,15 ** -0,14 *
Employer -0,43 ** -0,11 0,56 *** 0,28 ** -0,68 *** -0,07 -0,08 -0,41 ** 0,27 ** -0,38 * 0,04 0,36 *** -0,14 0,13
'Satisfied' Self-employed -0,06 -0,07 0,11 -0,19 ** 0,02 0,16 * -0,04 -0,39 *** 0,22 ** -0,06 -0,14 0,09 0,01 -0,01
'Unsatisfied' Self-employed -0,03 -0,40 * 0,32 * -0,36 *** 0,19 0,30 *** -0,26 ** -0,26 0,37 *** -0,11 0,12 0,08 -0,19 * 0,20 *
Unemployed -0,07 0,61 -0,39 -0,71 *** 1,22 *** 0,32 0,17 0,40 -0,40 0,24 -0,08 -0,23 -0,27 -1,08 0,16
Inactive/Discouraged 0,08 0,72 *** -0,73 *** -1,02 *** 1,80 *** 0,34 0,35 0,34 -0,59 ** 0,24 0,20 -0,32 * 0,16 -1,19 -0,36
Level of schooling of highest earner
No schooling/Incomp. Primary (omitted)
Complete primary 0,04 -0,20 * 0,15 0,03 0,00 -0,02 -0,18 * 0,09 0,14 -0,01 0,55 *** -0,14 0,26 *** 0,72 -0,32 ***
Incomplete secondary 0,09 -0,26 * 0,12 0,27 *** -0,40 *** -0,12 -0,02 -0,24 * 0,14 -0,03 0,44 ** -0,09 0,09 1,63 ** -0,17
Complete secondary -0,10 -0,41 ** 0,47 *** 0,55 *** -0,45 ** -0,38 *** 0,01 -0,11 0,03 0,02 0,69 *** -0,21 0,22 * 0,87 -0,32 ***
Incomplete University 0,02 -0,93 *** 0,69 *** 0,61 *** -0,41 * -0,49 *** 0,06 -0,41 0,13 -0,14 0,59 ** -0,01 0,65 *** 2,62 *** -0,82 ***
Complete University 0,10 -1,00 *** 0,68 ** 1,02 *** -0,62 ** -0,87 *** -0,03 0,19 -0,10 0,03 1,07 *** -0,33 0,51 *** 1,01 -0,62 ***
Number of children under 14 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 -0,08 -0,30 ** 0,31 *** -0,21 *** 0,08 0,18 ** 0,16 ** 0,16 -0,23 *** -0,12 0,16 0,08 -0,23 *** -0,82 * 0,25 ***
2 -0,13 0,05 0,13 -0,05 0,22 -0,04 -0,14 -0,02 0,14 0,02 -0,01 -0,01 -0,43 *** -0,58 0,45 ***
3 or more -0,02 0,08 -0,03 -0,33 ** 0,26 0,24 * -0,03 0,14 -0,03 0,02 -0,13 0,03 -0,59 *** -0,36 0,62 ***
Number of elderly over 60 in hh.
0 (omitted)
1 -0,23 * 0,32 ** 0,00 0,00 0,22 * -0,07 0,33 *** -0,07 -0,29 *** -0,05 0,10 0,02 -0,12 -6,91 0,12
2 or more -1,13 *** 0,99 *** 0,36 * 0,30 * -0,01 -0,31 * -0,06 0,34 -0,18 -0,52 *** 0,37 0,43 *** -0,21 -7,13 *** 0,30 *
Number of income earners in hh. -0,12 ** -0,16 *** 0,26 *** 0,16 ** -0,49 *** 0,00 -0,25 *** -0,12 0,30 *** -0,34 *** -0,05 0,35 *** -0,11 * -2,10 *** 0,16 **
Constant -0,05 -3,08 ** 1,20 4,63 *** -6,15 *** -3,37 *** 0,10 -2,09 -0,01 -0,21 -0,38 -0,38 1,65 *** -0,98 -1,81 ***
Number obs. 1376,00 1376,00 1376,00 2140,00 2140,00 2140,00 2203,00 2203,00 2203,00 2552,00 2552,00 2552,00 2485,00 1361,00 2485,00
Log-likelihood -916,4 -666,7 -759,6 -1392,8 -628,9 -1380,4 -1436,1 -832,6 -1408,9 -1682,4 -510,4 -1640,9 -1612,7 -68.142 -1571,9
LR chi2(3) 71,78 83,83 74,83 165,21 71,07 183,91 129,26 95,63 204,19 172,80 52,76 223,41 219,36 159.49 298,43
Pseudo R2 0,04 0,06 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,06 0,04 0,05 0,07 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,06 0.5392 0,09
Standard errors omitted to save space; *=significant at the 10% prob. Level; **=significant at 5% ;  ***=significant at 1%. 
Table 10.c: Probits using 'Least Relative' definition of population groups.
1991/1992 1993/1994 1994/1995 1998/1999 1999/2000
winner immob loser winner immob loser winner immob winner immob loserloser winner immob loser
